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POLITICS AND THIE SUPREME COURT: THE
NEED FOR IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE
David Orentlicher*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is part of a larger project that I have undertaken for several years
on the importance of ideologically-balanced government. Our political system
suffers from multiple "winner-take-all" features that disenfranchise many, and
sometimes a majority of, Americans.'
In a book and article,2 I considered the problem of winner-take-all politics in
the context of the executive branch. When we give all of the immense executive
power to a single person from a single political party, we cause three serious and
related harms-we deny meaningful representation in the development of national
policy to half the public, we fuel partisan polarization as the party out of power fights
to regain control of the Oval Office, and we increase the risk of ill-advised public
policies. Better decisions are made when they are based on a diversity of
perspectives.
The problem of winner-take-all politics is not as serious on the Supreme Court
as in the White House. The Court typically includes a mix of conservative and liberal
Justices. But the ability of a conservative or liberal majority to impose its perspective
* Cobeaga Law Firm Professor, UNLV William S. Boyd School of Law. M.D., J.D., Harvard University.
I am grateful for the research assistance of Emily Inman and Benjamin Keele, comments from Lee Epstein,
John Ferejohn, Gerard Magliocca, John Wcfing, and Robert Williams, and editorial assistance from the
Pitt Law Review Volume 79 staff.
' In a typical election, the losing candidate may win close to half the vote, but still end up with nothing to
show for it. Whoever gets the most votes wins all of the power of the office at stake. And in most U.S.
legislative bodies, the majority party can pass its preferred bills despite opposition from the minority party.
2 See DAVID ORENTLICHER, Two PRESIDENTS ARE BETTER THAN ONE: THE CASE FOR A BIPARTISAN
ExECUTIVE BRANCH (2013) [hereinafter ORENTLICHER, Two PRESIDENTS]; David Orentlicher, Political
Dysfunction and the Election of Donald Trump: Problems of the U.S. Constitution's Presidency, 50 IND.
L. REV. 247 (2016). Several paragraphs of this article are drawn from the book and article.
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creates the same kinds of problems as a single executive who imposes a conservative
or liberal perspective. Members of the public who share the perspective of the Court
minority lack meaningful representation on many important issues, the judicial
appointment process has become highly politicized as each side fights for a Court
majority, and we increase the risk of ill-advised decisions.
Accordingly, I argue in this Article for a Supreme Court that functions on an
ideologically balanced basis.' With ideological balance, the Court would provide
meaningful representation to all, it would defuse the politicization of judicial
appointments, and it would make wiser decisions. On the relevant metrics, a Court
with ideological balance is superior to a Court that brings an ideological bias to its
work. Indeed, it is difficult to identify a good reason for permitting the Court to
function with a majority on one side or the other of the ideological spectrum. While
we can point to the principle of majority rule to justify partisan control in the
executive or legislative branches, popular majorities do not deserve special
recognition in a judicial branch that should be guided by legal principle rather than
popular sentiment.
II. THE RATIONALE FOR IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE ON THE
SUPREME COURT
When all of its seats are filled, the Supreme Court operates with either a
conservative or liberal majority.' As a result, on politically controversial issues, the
Court majority is able to impose its preferences on the entire country. These one-
sided decisions leave the losing side-often half or more of the public-without a
voice in the shaping of constitutional policy. That half of the public lacks meaningful
In my proposal for bringing ideological balance to the executive branch, I observed that one of the virtues
of doing so would be to bring ideological balance to the Supreme Court. ORENTLICHER, TWO PRESIDENTS,
supra note 2, at 27-31.
4 This is not to say that a majority consistently sides with the conservative or liberal position. "Swing
Justices" such as Justice Anthony Kennedy can cross over to the minority now and then, as Justice
Kennedy has done on cases involving discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See, e.g.,
Obergefcll v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
In recent years, the conservative-liberal split has lined up with partisan politics. For most of the
Court's history, there were conservative Justices who had been appointed by Democratic presidents, and
liberal Justices who had been appointed by Republican presidents. Since 2010, the Justices in the liberal
wing of the Court all were nominated by Democratic presidents, and the Justices in the conservative wing
all were nominated by Republican presidents. Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How
Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 Sup. CT. REV. 301 (2016).
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representation on the critical judicial decisions that define the extent of governmental
power and the breadth of a person's constitutional rights.
To be sure, if Justices merely acted like umpires, doing something akin to the
calling of balls and strikes, as suggested by Chief Justice John Roberts in his
confirmation hearings,' a Justice's political philosophy would not matter. But of
course, a Justice's political philosophy does matter.' Otherwise, Republican Senators
would have considered Merrick Garland's nomination to the Supreme Court in 2016,
and other nominations also would not fail because of partisan opposition. Some
Justices take more conservative positions, while others take more liberal positions.7
A conservative majority will render different decisions on environmental regulation,
reproductive rights, or voting rights than will a liberal majority. When Court
decisions reflect the philosophical leanings of the Justices, and decisions can be
determined by one side of the political spectrum, our system denies genuine
representation for the other side of the political spectrum. And that is fundamentally
unfair in a constitutional system based on the principle of representation for all.
It is especially unfair because political views should not carry the same weight
in the courts as in Congress or the White House. While there are important arguments
for giving the political majority greater power than the political minority in the
legislative and executive branches,' those arguments do not carry over to the judicial
branch. Justices and judges are authorized to decide based on legal principle, not
based on popular preferences.
The unfairness is compounded by the fact that one side can lack meaningful
representation for long periods of time. We generally trust majority rule because the
composition of the majority will vary from one decision to another. One may lose on
a foreign policy question but prevail on a domestic policy question. Over the long
haul, each person will win many times even if not most of the time. But, majority
rule becomes unfair when some people are persistently in the minority, always losing
sConfirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to Be ChiefJustice ofthe United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005).
6 LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 103 (2013).
Lee Epstein ct a]., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?,
101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1483, 1491 (2007) [hereinafter Epstein ct al., Ideological Drift].
While I agree that one can make important normative arguments for majority rule, I also believe that one
can make stronger arguments for the sharing of power between the majority and minority, especially when
the public is fairly evenly divided in a two-party system, as is the case in the United States.
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out. As Justice Byron White wrote, the Constitution is violated when "a particular
group has been ... denied its chance to effectively influence the political process." 9
At the Supreme Court, with its lifelong tenure for Justices, the minority can be
effectively denied its ability to influence key judicial decisions for many years.'o
Denying meaningful representation also compromises the credibility of the
judiciary. When guaranteed a fair process, people are likely more willing to accept
decisions that do not go their way. But without a voice, the losing side becomes more
inclined toward resistance.
With ideological balance, the Court would respond to the problem of non-
representation by giving voice to both sides of the political spectrum. Conservatives
and liberals alike could always be sure that Supreme Court decisions take into
account their perspectives.
Ideological balance also would defuse the partisan maneuvering that plagues
the judicial appointment process. While partisan confirmation battles are not new,
the judicial appointment process has become persistently and increasingly partisan
for both Supreme Court Justices and lower federal court judges since Democrats
blocked Republican President Ronald Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert Bork to
the Supreme Court in 1987." When power is divided between a Democratic
president and a Republican Senate, or a Republican president and a Democratic
Senate, many nominees are denied a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
or the Committee votes against sending nominations to the floor for a vote.1 2
Moreover, even when a judge or Justice is approved by the Senate, the process may
stretch out over months or years. Because of the partisan barriers to appointment, a
' Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132-33 (1986). This concern about persistent denial of influence in
the political process provides a key reason for courts to invoke the Equal Protection Clause to protect
people against discrimination. David Orentlicher, Discrimination Out of Dismissiveness: The Example of
Infertility, 85 IND. L.J. 143, 147-51 (2010).
"n Since Clarence Thomas succeeded Thurgood Marshall in 1991, there has not been a majority of liberal
Justices on the Court. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rise ofFederalism, 25-MAR L.A. LAW. 27,27 (2002).
" See Devins & Baum, supra note 4; Gary L. McDowell, Bork Was the Beginning: Constitutional
Moralism and the Politics ofFederal Judicial Selection, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 809 (2005).
2 See id; see also Philip Rucker & Robert Barnes, As Obama's nominees languish in GOP Senate, Trump
to inherit more than 100 court vacancies, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 25, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune
.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-trump-court-vacancies-20161225-story.html (discussing Democratic
President Barack Obama's nominations slowing to a crawl when a Republican-led Senate took over in
2015, including infamously denying Judge Merrick Garland a hearing to replace deceased Justice Antonin
Scalia in 2016).
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president might never make nominations for some open seats during the president's
term.
Statistics from the administration of Bill Clinton are illustrative. In his first two
years of office, Democrats controlled a majority of seats in the Senate, and the
Judiciary Committee held hearings on more than 90% of Clinton's nominees.
Republicans regained control of the Senate in November 1994, and the Judiciary
Committee held hearings on 74%, 79% and 47% of Clinton nominees over the
subsequent two-year segments of Clinton's eight years in office.' 3
With ideological balance on the Court, where neither party could gain a
majority, there would be no payoff from partisan obstruction. Blocking appointments
would not increase a party's ability to impose its political philosophy. Accordingly,
Supreme Court vacancies would be filled more swiftly.
With ideological balance, the Court also would generate wiser decisions.
Conservative and liberal Justices bring different perspectives about the balance
between state and federal power, government power and individual liberties, and
corporate power and consumer rights. We all benefit when legal rules reflect the
perspectives of both sides of the ideological spectrum rather than the views of one
side. Neither side has a monopoly on the truth; both sides have their policy blind
spots. Conservative Justices can steer their liberal counterparts away from misguided
decisions and toward desirable decisions, and liberal Justices can do the same for
their conservative partners. In other words, with ideological balance, the Court would
find a middle ground between conservative and liberal viewpoints and generate
better decisions overall.
Even for those who think their side of the philosophical divide is the correct
side, they should prefer a Court with ideological balance. Suppose one is
conservative and believes that conservative majorities issue better decisions. Since
American voters are nearly evenly split between Democratic and Republican voters,
one can expect conservative majorities roughly half of the time and liberal majorities
the other half of the time. For the conservative voter, half of the decisions over time
would be good and half would be bad. Because the harm from bad decisions can be
much greater than the benefit from good decisions (consider the difference between
losing one's wealth from bad investments and increasing one's wealth from good
13 LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
205 (2005).
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investments), one would be better off overall with decisions that always are balanced
between conservative and liberal viewpoints.
Finally, with ideological balance, the Court would be more faithful to the
framers' intentions for our constitutional system. The founding fathers worried
greatly about narrowly-interested "factions" pursuing their self-interest to the
detriment of the overall public good. Accordingly, the constitutional drafters
designed a system that they thought would block factional control of the national
government. 14 But the framers did not anticipate the extent to which political parties
would form powerful factions that could gain control of government power. For
example, the framers did not anticipate how partisan ties between presidents and
members of Congress would overcome the intended checking and balancing roles
that the executive and legislative branches would play." Similarly, the framers did
not expect-nor did they want-a Supreme Court that would reflect the views of
only one side of the political spectrum. Because the constitutional design has failed
to ensure the framers' desired ideological balance, reform is needed now.
But, one might ask, is there always a middle ground to be found? Isn't there
either a right to an abortion or not a right to abortion? Isn't there either a right to bear
arms or not?
Even in such cases, Justices can compromise, and in fact they often have,
especially when the resolution of controversial issues is driven by relatively
moderate, "swing" Justices. For both abortion and guns, the Court has recognized a
right but also given the government power to regulate the right. States can encourage
women to choose childbirth over abortion, they can require a 24-hour waiting period
before the procedure is performed, and they can require parental notification before
a minor's abortion (as long as minors can bypass parental notification by going to
court).16 In the case of the right to bear arms, the government can require rigorous
background checks for gun purchasers and limit the firepower of guns that can be
sold.1 7
14 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18-21 (7th ed. 2013).
"s Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311
(2006). When the president comes from the same party as the congressional majority, the executive and
legislative branches reinforce, rather than restrain, each other.
16 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-85, 899-900 (1992).
" See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008).
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The European approach to the judiciary also indicates that a middle ground
always can be found. Specialized constitutional courts are responsible for
constitutional decisions in European countries." The Justices on those courts
typically are moderate and operate on the basis of consensus, with dissenting
opinions rare and in some countries nonexistent.19
IHI. ACHIEVING IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE
How would we generate ideological balance on the Supreme Court? We could
seek a Court made up of Justices each of whom is politically moderate, as is typical
for the European constitutional courts. That could be achieved by ensuring that all
nominees secure the support of both Democratic and Republican elected officials.
Alternatively, we could seek a Court that has an overall ideological balance
between conservative and liberal Justices, similar to New Jersey's practice for its
state supreme court.20 To achieve an overall balance, there could be an even number
of Justices, with half reserved for Democratic nominees and half reserved for
Republican nominees.21 With this approach, we would make permanent the balance
on the Court that existed between the death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February
2016 and the appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch in April 2017, with its 4-4 split
between conservative and liberal Justices.
A third approach would be to seek ideologically balanced decisions rather than
ideologically balanced Justices or an ideologically balanced Court. For example, we
could require the Court to issue decisions that are supported by a supermajority of
Justices, as on the Nebraska and North Dakota Supreme Courts. 22 Or to be even more
" John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1671, 1676-78 (2004). For non-constitutional cases, other courts are available. Id.
'Id at 1678, 1692-93, 1702.
20 In New Jersey, three seats are reserved for Democrats, three for Republicans, and the affiliation of the
seventh justice is determined by the governor when the seventh seat opens up. John B. Wefing, The New
Jersey Supreme Court 1948-1998: Fifty Years oflndependence andActivism, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 701, 715-
16(1998).
21 ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM 33 (1955); David Orentlicher, Make the
Supreme Court's 4-4 Split Permanent, Z6CALO PUB. SQUARE (June 25, 2016), http://www.zocalopublic
square.org/2016/06/24/make-supreme-courts-4-4-split-permanent/idcas/nexus/; Eric J. Segall, Eight
Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to Improve the United States Supreme Court, 45 PEPP. L. REv. 547
(2018).
22 In Nebraska, the Supreme Court can declare legislation unconstitutional only with the concurrence of
at least five of the court's seven judges. NEB. CONST. art- V, § 2. In North Dakota, four out of the five
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confident of ideological balance, we could require the Court to operate on the basis
of consensus. Some constitutional courts in Europe seek ideological balance by
requiring both the appointment of moderate Justices and the making of decisions on
the basis of consensus. 23
I will discuss the three approaches separately and then consider the advantages
and disadvantages for each.
A. Ideologically Balanced Justices
Under this reform, the goal would be to appoint Justices who are
philosophically moderate rather than strongly conservative or liberal in their judicial
philosophy. 24 In European countries, this is accomplished by requiring approval of
nominees by a supermajority vote and therefore by elected officials on both sides of
the political aisle.25 In Germany, for example, nominees to the Constitutional Court
must receive a two-thirds vote of approval, so must appeal to legislators across the
ideological spectrum.26 We have had something like that in the United States, with
Supreme Court justices must agree before legislation can be deemed unconstitutional. N.D. CONST. art.
VI, §§ 2, 4.
* Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 18, at 1681, 1692-93.
24 While there may be some Justices who truly lie in the middle of the political spectrum, most will come
to the bench with either conservative or liberal leanings. By "moderate" Justices, I mean Justices whose
conservative or liberal leanings are mild rather than strong.
' Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 18, at 1681.
26 GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 83 (2005); Bruce
Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 669 (2000). The German model has
developed a number of features to reduce partisan battles over nominees. As indicated, the requirement
of a two-thirds vote for approval prevents the majority party from imposing its preferences. To further
avoid conflict over individual nominees, the major parties have agreed to an even allocation of seats
between themselves with a smaller number of seats for the minor parties. Thus, if a Social Democrat judge
steps down, the Social Democrats identify a replacement. Uwe Kischel, Party, Pope, and Politics? The
Election ofGerman Constitutional Court Justices in Comparative Perspective, II INT'L J. CONST. L. 962,
964-65 (2013). But even though the seats are allocated by party, each nominee still must secure broad
support. As a result, the German court does not have the kind of strongly ideological members seen on
the Supreme Court of the United States. CHRISTINE LANDFRIED, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND
LEGISLATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, in CONST. REV. & LEGIS. 147, 148 (Christine
Landfried ed., 1988); VANBERG, supra, at 83; Ackerman, supra, at 669; Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note
18, at 1702 n.131; Telephone interview with Frank Emmert, Professor, Indiana University Robert H.
McKinney School of Law (Apr. 24,2017). With its allocation ofjudicial seats, the German Court operates
as a hybrid of a court with ideologically moderate judges and an overall ideological balance.
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Supreme Court nominees being subjected to the filibuster rule,27 but the minority
party did not exercise its filibuster power on a regular basis to force nomination of
moderate candidates. And when it did, the majority party eliminated the filibuster
rule, in 2013 for lower court nominees,28 and again in 2017 for Supreme Court
nominees.29 Perhaps a requirement of approval by a two-thirds vote of the Senate
would result in a process more like that in Germany, with its nomination of relatively
moderate judges.
A second way to ensure nomination of moderate Justices would be for the
Senate to exercise its advisory role for judicial nominations3 0 and create a judicial
nominating commission with an equal number of Senate Democrats and Senate
Republicans. 3 For each judicial opening, the commission could recommend a small
number of potential nominees to the president. Such a system would generate
moderate nominees because strongly conservative nominees would be unacceptable
to the Democratic members of the commission, and strongly liberal nominees would
be unacceptable to the Republican members of the commission. More appointees
would be like Byron White in their moderation and fewer like William Brennan or
Antonin Scalia at one end or the other of the ideological spectrum. 32
Of course, presidents already look to the Senate for guidance in their
nomination of lower court judges. Often, presidents defer to the recommendations of
a state's senators; in Wisconsin, the process has been formalized with a nominating
commission that makes recommendations to the state's senators.33 In addition, some
27 While Senate actions typically require majority support for passage, a motion to close debate (cloture)
required a 60-vote majority. Opponents could block adoption of a bill or approval of a presidential
nominee as long as they had 41 votes to block a cloture motion through a filibuster. CHRISTOPHER DAVIS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-425, INVOKING CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 1 (2017).
2 Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Vote Curbs Filibuster Power to Stall Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013,
at Al. The Senate also eliminated the filibuster for executive branch appointments. Id
29 Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy 'Nuclear Option' to Clear Path for Gorsuch, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2017, at Al.
30 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (describing the presidential power to appoint Supreme Court Justices and other
federal judges with the "advice and consent of the Senate").
" Such a commission might include the Senate Majority Leader, the Senate Minority Leader, the Senate
Judiciary Committee chair, and the ranking minority member of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
32 Epstein et al., Ideological Drift, supra note 7, at 1491-93.
3 Federal Nominating Commission, STATE BAR OF Wis., http://www.wisbar.org/aboutus/goverment
relations/pages/federal-nominating-commission.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.565
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE |420 (VOL. 79 2018
states rely on nominating commissions for appointments to their courts of appeal and
supreme courts.
B. An Ideologically Balanced Court
Under this reform, there would be an even number of Justices, say eight, ten,
twelve, or more, 34 and the seats would be evenly divided between conservative and
liberal seats. If a conservative seat opened, the new Justice would be chosen from a
pool of conservative candidates, and if a liberal seat opened, the new Justice would
be chosen from a pool of liberal candidates.
The model of judicial nominating commissions could be used to identify the
pool of candidates. Instead of a single bipartisan nominating commission favoring
moderate nominees, there could be two nominating commissions, one for
conservative appointments and the other for liberal appointments. One commission
could include the Senate Majority Leader and the chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee; the other commission could include the Senate Minority Leader and the
ranking minority member of the Senate Judiciary Committee." When a conservative
seat opened up, the Republican nominating commission could recommend potential
nominees to the president, and when a liberal seat opened up, the Democratic
nominating commission could recommend potential nominees to the president.
Note a key advantage of linking the ideology of appointments to the nominators
rather than the nominees. If a Democratic president is obliged to nominate a
conservative Justice, or a Republican president to nominate for a liberal seat, we
would have to worry about efforts by presidents to game the system. The Democratic
president might seek a liberal Republican for a conservative seat, and a Republican
president might seek a conservative Democrat for a liberal seat. By linking ideology
to the elected officials with nominating authority, we can rely on the officials' self-
interest to achieve the desired ideological balance. The Republican nominating
commission would be careful to identify conservative candidates, and the
Democratic nominating commission would be careful to identify liberal candidates. 36
3 Research on jury size suggests that a 12-person Court would be superior to a Court with fewer members.
Alisa Smith & Michael J. Saks, The Case for Overturning Williams v. Florida and the Six-Person Jury:
History, Law, and Empirical Evidence, 60 FLA. L. REV. 441, 463-68 (2008).
s Thus, one of the nominating commissions would have Democratic members while the other commission
would have Republican members.
36 Linking ideology to the nominators also avoids First Amendment problems. If the nominees must have
a specific political affiliation (e.g., Democrat or Republican), then any candidate with a different or no
political affiliation would automatically be rejected. A federal district court has held that to be
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Of course, elected officials might try to game a system with equal numbers of
conservative and liberal Justices by blocking the other side from filling an open seat.
For example, if a conservative Justice stepped down, and Democrats held a majority
in the Senate, they might deny a hearing to a new nominee, preserving a majority of
liberal Justices. To prevent that kind of gaming, the law could require recusal of a
liberal Justice until the open seat was filled3 7 so all cases would be decided by an
evenly balanced Court. Recusal would be desirable in other situations to maintain an
even balance among Justices participating in decisions. For example, if a Justice had
to recuse in a particular case because of a personal conflict of interest, we would
want a judge from the other side of the political spectrum to recuse for that case.
Elected officials also might try to game the system by forcing the other side to
nominate relatively moderate Justices. For example, a Republican Senate might try
to block a Democratic president's effort to appoint a strongly liberal Justice. To avoid
that problem, reform could eliminate Senate confirmation and require the president
to choose among candidates identified by the nominating commissions. Some states
have similar approaches for appointments to their state supreme courts, with
participation by the governor and a judicial commission. In Indiana, the governor
must choose from a group of candidates proposed by a judicial nominating
commission. 8 In California, a judicial appointments commission must approve the
governor's nominee to the state supreme court.39 Neither state requires a legislative
vote.
Imposing a balance between liberals and conservatives on the Supreme Court
may seem odd, but something similar has been done in New Jersey for many years.
Under a 70-year tradition, Democrats and Republicans each hold three of the New
Jersey Supreme Court's seven seats, with the Governor's party getting a fourth seat
when the seventh seat opens up.40 That way, both sides of the ideological divide
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. Adams v. Camey, 2018 WL 3105113 (D. Del. June 25,
2018).
37 The liberal Justices could take turns recusing themselves so each would miss a similar number of cases.
38 IND. CONST. art. Vil, § 10.
3 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(d)(2).
' John B. Wefing, Two Cheers for the Appointment System, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 583, 597-98 (2010). Even
before the 1947 New Jersey Constitution created the current seven-member state supreme court, New
Jersey had a longstanding tradition of a bipartisan judiciary. Id.; VANDERBILT, supra note 21, at 32-33.
Delaware has a similar system per its state constitution. There must be at least two Democrats and two
Republicans on the five-member court. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (requiring that "three of the five Justices
of the Supreme Court in office at the same time, shall be of one major political party, and two of said
Justices shall be of the other major political party"). But see Adams, 2018 WL 3105113 (invoking the First
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always have at least three of the seven seats. And this division of power has worked
very well. Legal scholars have measured the extent to which the decisions of a
supreme court in one state influence the decisions of supreme courts in other states.
The New Jersey Supreme Court regularly ranks as one of the most influential. 41 in
1976, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court led the way in recognizing the
right to make medical decisions at the end of life in the landmark Quinlan case.42
It also would not be novel to have an even number of Justices on the Supreme
Court. While an odd number of Justices is the more common approach for high
courts, it is by no means the only approach. For example, the constitutional courts in
Germany and Spain have sixteen and twelve judges, respectively. 43 Similarly,
Austria's constitutional court has twenty judges, and Belgium's has twelve." I will
address later the concern that an even ideological balance would result in too much
gridlock.
C. Ideologically Balanced Decisions
Under this reform, decisions would require support from at least a
supermajority of Justices or perhaps the full Court. With the current nine-Justice
Court, a cohort of at least six Justices would constitute a supermajority needed to
Amendment to strike down Delaware's allocation of judicial seats on the ground that a person's political
affiliation should not disqualify the person from consideration for judicial positions). Also, U.S. Senators
Jacob Javits (R-NY) and Daniel Moynihan (D-NY) worked out their own allocation of judicial
nominations by party that was continued between Moynihan and U.S. Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY).
The senator whose party controlled the White House would get three out of four nominations. Kirk
Johnson, The Street Fighter and the Professor; Moynihan and D'Amato: A Loyal Pair, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 15, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/ 1993/03/15/nyregion/the-street-fighter-and-the-professor-
moynihan-and-d-amato-a-loyal-pair.html.
' Wefing, supra note 20, at 701-02; Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, "Followed Rates" and Leading
State Cases, 1940-2005, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 697 (2007).
42 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). As indicated, the requirement of a 2/3 majority for approval
in Germany has led to a system in which seats on the Constitutional Court are assigned in a balanced way
by party affiliation. Kischel, supra note 26, at 964-65.
43 Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 18, at 1681-82. The German Court is divided into two 8-judge Senates,
one of which handles claims involving constitutional rights, the other of which handles other claims,
including matters of government structure and most issues relating to the European Union. Rudolf Streinz,
The Role of the German Federal Constitutional Court Law and Politics, 31 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 95, 97
(2014).
4 World Factbook, C.I.A., https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2094.html
(last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
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render a decision. By requiring a supermajority of Justices, decisions would typically
need support from at least one Justice on each side of the ideological spectrum. 45
How large should the supermajority be? Since there may be times when six
Justices are either conservative or liberal, it probably would be necessary to require
more than a two-thirds supermajority to ensure that decisions always reflect the
perspectives of both sides of the philosophical divide. Likely, it would make most
sense to require decision making by consensus of the entire Court.
While concerns might arise about the ability of a Court to operate effectively
when it can render decisions only by supermajority vote, we know from the
experience in Nebraska, North Dakota, and Europe that high courts can function well
with supermajority voting, including decision making based on consensus.
Of course, decision by consensus should be easier on courts whose judges
generally are politically moderate, as with the European constitutional courts. But
we also have an important example of decision making by consensus when the
decision makers bring different ideological perspectives to the table-the Swiss
Federal Council. The Federal Council exercises the executive power in Switzerland
in a consensual manner, and it includes seven members who represent the major
political parties in the country.'
The comparison with European courts raises an important question.
Supermajority voting exists in Europe, but it does so in a system where only the
constitutional court can decide constitutional questions. In the United States, where
lower courts also decide constitutional questions, there may be a greater risk that
supermajority voting on the Supreme Court would result in deadlock on particular
issues, leaving more issues to be decided by circuit courts of appeal. In the next
section, I will explain why this is not likely to happen.
IV. CHOOSING AMONG THE DIFFERENT PATHS TO
IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE
With three potential paths to ideological balance, is one preferable to the
others? Each approach has some advantages and disadvantages. On balance, a
combination of approaches makes the most sense.
45 A supermajority requirement is an implicit feature of a Court evenly split between conservative and
liberal Justices-the ideologically balanced Court discussed in the previous section. If there are four
conservative and four liberal Justices, for example, a supermajority of five Justices (62.5%) would be
needed to render a decision.
46 ORENTLICHER, Two PRESIDENTS, supra note 2, at 116-18.
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A. Ideologically Balanced Justices
Basing reform on a goal of making ideologically moderate appointments carries
the key advantage of being applicable not only to appellate courts but to district
courts as well. The Supreme Court leaves many issues to be decided by the circuit
courts of appeal, which in turn may leave issues to be decided by the trial courts. For
such issues, ideological balance would not be achieved if balance were incorporated
only into the higher courts.
And politically moderate appointments would be especially valuable at the
district court level, where there is only one judge deciding each case. It would be
fairer to litigants overall to have their claims resolved by a moderate judge rather
than by a conservative or liberal judge. A conservative judge's philosophical
leanings may favor one side of a contest, while a liberal judge's leanings may favor
the other side. A moderate judge is least likely to reach decisions that favor one side
or the other because of the judge's philosophical perspective.4 7
Ideologically moderate appointments are also beneficial because lawyers
aspiring to the bench would not need to become politically active with one party or
the other in order to improve their chances of appointment.
There are a few disadvantages to a policy based on ideologically moderate
appointments. First, at the appellate level, courts would bring a narrower range of
judicial views to their deliberations. In general, diversity of perspectives fosters
better decision making.48 An appellate court that includes strongly conservative and
liberal members would approach its decisions with a greater range of viewpoints than
would a court filled with only moderate appointees.
Second, while Justices or judges might be seen as moderate when appointed,
they may become more conservative or liberal over time-the "ideological drift"
phenomenon. At some times, drift might result in a relatively conservative court,
while at other times, it might result in a relatively liberal court.
Finally, it would take time to fully implement this reform. As Justices or judges
step down from the appellate bench, they could be replaced by moderate appointees.
But for many years, higher courts will have a mix of conservative, liberal, and
moderate Justices or judges, and the mix could lean either conservative or liberal
overall.
47 Alternatively, district courts could be staffed by multiple judges, as currently happens in cases involving
a constitutional challenge to legislative redistricting. 28 U.S.C. § 2284. I am grateful to Vicki Jackson for
this point.
' ORENTLICHER, TWO PRESIDENTS, supra note 2, at 148-49.
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B. Ideologically Balanced Courts
Having ideologically balanced courts-courts with even numbers of
conservative and liberal Justices or judges-addresses the ideological diversity
problem of a system whose Justices and judges all are philosophically moderate. An
ideologically balanced court can include a wide range of perspectives among its
members.
In addition, implementation could be achieved quickly by increasing the
number of seats on courts that lack an ideological balance currently. In the case of
the Supreme Court, for example, with its 5-4 conservative majority, increasing the
size of the Court by one liberal Justice would allow for rapid balance.
One might worry that an evenly divided court could deadlock with some
frequency. However, it is unlikely to do so. To be sure, the Supreme Court punted
on a number of key cases when it had a 4-4 conservative-liberal balance between
Justice Scalia's death and Justice Gorsuch's appointment. Punting is an attractive
option when the 4-4 balance is temporary, as it was then-but punting is not so
tempting when the division of power is permanent. If the Justices knew that there
always would be an even sharing of power, they could not delay their rulings in the
hope that they would later be able to secure a majority for their views.
In addition to lacking an incentive to punt, Justices on an evenly-divided Court
would have a strong incentive to find the middle ground. Supreme Court Justices
want to leave their imprint on the law-after spending years, if not decades,
maneuvering for a Court appointment and having reached the pinnacle of the
judiciary, they would be driven by their desire to leave an important judicial legacy.
If the Justices spent their years on the Court bogged down in gridlock, they would
not be able to issue key decisions that would allow them to make a difference in
resolving important legal questions. Accordingly, they would come to
accommodations that would allow them to issue meaningful decisions.
We got a sense of that with the 4-4 Court after Justice Scalia's death. The
Justices did more compromising because each side realized it could do its job only
by working with the other side.49 With a permanent ideological balance, the
incentives for compromise would be even greater.
49 Patrick Marley, Justice Elena Kagan Says Court Had to Reach More Consensus after Antonin Scalia's
Death, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2017/09/
08/justice-elena-kagan-says-court-had-reach-more-consensus-after-antonin-scalias-death/ 6 4 6 125001/.
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Another source of data on the impact of an even number of Justices indicates
that deadlock would not be a significant problem. As with the 4-4 Court in 2016-17,
the Court from time to time operates with an even number of Justices, sometimes
because of a vacant seat on the Court, other times because of illness or recusal. In a
study of the 1319 cases in which a tie could have occurred between the 1946 and
2003 terms of the Court, researchers found that a tie vote occurred less than 6% of
the time.s0
The experience with juries also suggests that evenly balanced courts would
reach decisions regularly. Criminal court juries typically have twelve members and
they usually have to reach unanimous decisions. Hung juries occur, but not very
often. Moreover, juries reach their unanimous decisions in a setting that allows for
less compromise than does a decision by an appellate court. A criminal jury must
acquit or convict."
Game theory provides further reason to believe that balanced courts would find
middle ground regularly. Game theory can identify the kinds of relationships that are
likely to encourage cooperative rather than oppositional strategies. An evenly
balanced court would incorporate key elements of cooperative relationships. For
example, when individuals have an ongoing relationship with frequent and repeated
interactions, as with members of an appellate court, they are much more likely to
choose cooperation with each other than when they have a one-shot relationship.
Cooperation is also more likely in relationships with an indefinite time horizon, as
with Justices and judges who have lifetime appointments, than when there is a finite
time horizon. Finally, cooperation is more common among individuals who come to
their relationship with equal status and authority. That is true about appellate court
Justices or judges, except perhaps with Chief Justices or Judges. The extra authority
of a Chief Justice or Judge may not be that important, but if it is, we could make the
Chief's role a rotating position, much as the members of the Swiss Federal Council
rotate through the position of president so they remain true equals in the Swiss
executive branch. 52
5" Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the "Problem" of an Equally Divided Supreme Court, 7 J.
APPELLATE PRACT. & PROC. 75, 85-86 (2005).
5' In some cases, juries can compromise if they have the option of convicting on a less serious charge.
52 ORENTLICHER, TWO PRESIDENTS, supra note 2, at 116. Justices on some state supreme courts rotate
through the chiefs seat on a routine basis. See, e.g., Missouri Courts, Supreme Court Judges, at
https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=133 (describing a tradition on the Missouri Supreme Court of
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There are some disadvantages to a policy of ideologically balanced courts.
Ideological diversity with an overall ideological balance only works for appellate
courts where there are multiplejudges or Justices. A single district courtjudge cannot
bring ideological diversity to the bench. In addition, as with a system favoring
moderate appointments, the approach of overall ideological balance suffers from the
problem of ideological drift. Judges or Justices nominated because of their
conservative leanings may take more liberal positions than expected, as happened
with Harry Blackmun and David Souter. Similarly, appointees chose for their liberal
viewpoints may vote in a more conservative fashion than expected, as happened with
John Harlan and Potter Stewart.53
C. Ideologically Balanced Decisions
Requiring ideologically balanced decisions through strong supermajority
voting would be the simplest reform. Since decisions would require support from
both sides of the ideological spectrum, we would generally get a diversity of
perspectives without having to change the method of nomination and appointment
for the Supreme Court or the circuit courts of appeals.
Supermajority voting also addresses the problem of ideological drift. Even with
Republican appointees becoming more liberal or Democratic appointees becoming
more conservative, decisions still would require support from both conservatives and
liberals. And supermajority voting can be implemented immediately, without any lag
time.
Supermajority voting fits in well with constitutional principle. To the extent
that an appellate court overrides a federal legislative or executive act, it is overriding
the majority will. Requiring a supermajority to override protects the principle of
majority rule againstjudicial overreach. Federal courts do not exercise the same level
of deference to state legislative or executive actions, but in those cases, courts are
interpreting the Constitution and effectively amending our understanding of the
Constitution. Accordingly, it makes sense for courts to do so by supermajority rule,
just as amendments to the Constitution require supermajority support from Congress
and the states.5 4
There are two key drawbacks to supermajority voting. While it would make the
appointment process less politicized than it currently stands, it would not defuse the
clections for chief justice "on a rotating basis by a vote of all seven Supreme Court judges to a two-year
term").
" Epstein et al., Ideological Drifi, supra note 7, at 1492.
1 U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring two-thirds support in the House and Senate to propose an amendment and
threc-fourths support among the states to ratify an amendment).
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politics of appointments entirely. Even with supermajority voting, it would matter
whether the majority of Justices or judges were conservative or liberal. And
supermajority voting would not address the problem of ideological imbalance at the
district court level.
D. Finding the Ideal Reform
On balance, we probably would do best with a mix of reforms. At the district
court level, where a single judge decides, we should ensure the appointment of
ideologically moderate judges so neither side of the political spectrum is favored
when judges render their decisions. As mentioned, that could be accomplished
through the use of a bipartisan judicial nominating commission.
At the circuit court and Supreme Court levels, reform should be based on a
combination of all three reforms. To realize the benefits of decision making that
results from a diversity of perspectives, we would want to ensure that court rulings
reflect a range of political viewpoints among the different Justices or judges." An
even balance between conservative and liberal Justices or judges and strong
supermajority voting each can provide that diversity. In addition, the two reforms
bring separate important advantages. The even balance would fully defuse the
politicization of the appointment process, while supermajority voting would only
partially do so, 5 6 and strong supermajority voting would compensate for the problem
of ideological drift that can occur with Justices or judges on a court that is supposed
to have an even balance of ideologies."
Including some politically moderate judges or Justices would be valuable to
further increase the diversity of perspectives on appellate courts. It would be
desirable to cover the full range of perspectives rather than just those on each end of
ss 1 have focused on ideological diversity because of the strong influence of political perspective on
judicial decision making. Should we also adopt policies to achieve similar balance among Justices or
judges on racial, ethnic or gender lines? On one hand, concerns about representation and voice are
important for all persons. On the other hand, the empirical evidence suggests that a person's political
affiliation may be much more important than other group identifications for their views on matters of
public policy. For example, women voters care much more about the political party than about the sex of
candidates for political office. Kathleen Dolan, Gender Stereotypes, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting
for Women Candidates: What Really Matters?, 67 POL. RES. Q. 96, 98, 104 (2016). Thus, female
Democrats are much more likely to vote for male Democrats than for female Republicans, and female
Republicans are much more likely to vote for Republican men than for female Democrats. Id. Perhaps it
would make sense to ensure ideological diversity on the courts as a first step and then consider whether
further changes would be desirable to promote other kinds of diversity,
56 See supra, at Sec. IV.B.
s See id
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the spectrum. In addition, the politically moderate judges or Justices could be drawn
from the district courts and bring with them their experience at the trial court level.
How would it look to combine all three reforms? A number of combinations
could work. I'll provide one example. For the Supreme Court, Congress could
increase the number of seats to twelve and designate four seats for conservative
Justices, four for liberal Justices, and four for politically moderate Justices. A
Republican nominating commission could identify candidates for the conservative
seats, a Democratic nominating commission for the liberal seats, and the two
nominating commissions could come together as a bipartisan commission to identify
candidates for the moderate seats. Supermajority voting could be included by
requiring support for Court decisions by all twelve Justices, or at least a
supermajority of ten Justices. With a minimum of ten for the supermajority, at least
two Justices would have to come from each of the three ideological blocs.
Another approach would be to try the different models in different states. We
rely on the states to test out innovative public policies through their role as
laboratories of experimentation.58 As mentioned, New Jersey already has adopted for
its highest court something similar to the model of a court with overall ideological
balance. Importantly, amendments to the Constitution typically emerge from models
developed by states. 59
V. Is THERE A DOWNSIDE TO IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE?
We might worry that a requirement of ideological balance and the need for
compromise would preclude decisions that bring major change to the country. Courts
often are viewed as engines of social reform. Would change come slowly and only
in small steps?
Of course, incremental change can be a virtue. By making limited rather than
expansive changes, courts reduce the risk of causing great harm from erroneous
decisions." Proceeding in small steps allows courts to test their theories carefully
and maximize the likelihood that they are taking legal doctrine in the right direction.
In addition, by proceeding at an incremental pace on important issues, courts
promote discussion and deliberation by the public and its elected officials on those
s New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
5 AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE
BY 467 (2012).
6 CASS SUJNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 4 (2001).
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issues and the opportunity for meaningful participation in the decision making
process.' Sweeping decisions short-circuit the democratic process and can provoke
stiff resistance and a backlash that compromise the very principles that the courts
were trying to advance and leave those principles with weaker recognition in the
end. 62
But even if major change is important, the Supreme Court's history
demonstrates that Justices and judges from different sides of the ideological
spectrum can come together to issue path breaking decisions. In fact, many of the
Court's landmark decisions enjoyed broad support among the Justices. When the
Court struck down segregated schools in Brown v. Board ofEducation, the vote was
unanimous.6 1 Similarly, Roe v. Wade was decided by a 7-2 vote." On many issues,
conservatives and liberals agree. Indeed, it is often said that people agree 80% of the
time and disagree 20% of the time. Ideological balance would drive courts toward
the 80% common ground and away from the 20% where perspectives differ.
Moreover, as Gerald Rosenberg has observed, the Supreme Court plays a more
limited role in implementing social reform than is commonly assumed. There are
important structural constraints on the effectiveness of the courts. As Alexander
Hamilton wrote in Federalist 78, the judicial branch is the "weakest" branch because
it controls neither the "sword or the purse" and must rely instead on the other
branches of government to carry out its decisions.6 1 With these and other constraints
(e.g., the political pressures that the president and Congress can exert on courts),
judicially-driven social reform generally requires that political, social and economic
change already have begun. It also requires substantial support for reform from the
president and Congress. 66
Thus, for example, the Supreme Court's 1954 school desegregation decision in
Brown v. Board ofEducation did not result in any real integration of southern schools
61 Id; Barry McDonald, Eight Justices Are Enough, N.Y. TIMFS, May 26, 2016, at A23.
62 Lincoln Caplan, Ginsburg's Roe v. Wade Blind Spot, N.Y. TtMES (May 13, 2013), https://takingnote
.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/ginsburgs-roe-v-wade-blindspot; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts
on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381-82 (1985).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
* Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
6 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE 35-36 (2d
ed. 2008).
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for a decade. National, state, and local political leaders, as well as the public, did not
provide support for-and indeed often opposed-the integration of schools. Ten
years after Brown, a number of factors allowed the decision to have an impact in the
South. Congress passed the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, the U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare exercised its authority under the two Acts to shape school policies, and
public sentiment had shifted. As a result, the decision in Brown and subsequent
judicial decisions were able to desegregate southern public schools.67
The lesson from Brown and other key cases is that courts can play an important
role in social reform, but they cannot do so when they try to implement policies that
go significantly against the grain of existing social norms. Rather, they must work in
tandem with prevailing political and social currents. Supreme Court Justices
generally recognize this reality. While they felt comfortable issuing their opinion in
Brown by a unanimous vote that included conservatives Felix Frankfurter and
Sherman Minton, the Justices declined to override bans on interracial marriage two
years later in Naim v. Naim. 68 Instead, they waited until the Loving69 clase in 1967
when public sentiment was more receptive to a decision on behalf of mixed-race
couples.70
Even what is perhaps the Court's most controversial modem opinion, Roe v.
Wade, came at a point when public support for a right to abortion was strong enough,
with a majority of Americans reporting that they supported a right in at least some
circumstances.7 1 Moreover, states had started to liberalize their abortion statutes, and
a decision in favor of abortion rights could attract broad support among the Justices.
The Roe Court's seven-Justice majority included conservatives Warren Burger,
Lewis Powell, and Potter Stewart. 72
67 Id at 51-54, 74-104. To be sure, the decision in Brown did lead quickly to integration in the border
states between the northern and southern United States. Id. at 50-51.
6 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
6' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
o Sanford Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821, 832-34 (2011).
71 Lydia Saad, Public Opinion About Abortion-An In-depth Review, GALLUP (Jan. 22, 2002),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/9904/public-opinion-about-abortion-indepth-review.aspx.
72 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The two dissenting Justices, William Rehnquist and Byron White,
came from the Court's conservative wing. Id.
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When the Court fails to reflect public sentiment, it can trigger backlash. The
Kelo eminent domain case provides a useful illustration. In that case, the Court
upheld the ability of governments to exercise their power of eminent domain and
seize the property of homeowners for privately-operated economic development.7 1
Public anger erupted quickly, and it led states across the country to pass statutes
curtailing the eminent domain power. Within five years of the Kelo decision, forty-
three states had revised their eminent domain statutes to make them more
restrictive. 74
In short, requiring ideological balance probably will not have a significant
effect on the likelihood that the Supreme Court or courts of appeal will champion
social reform. However, ideological balance will promote the key benefits that
winner-take-all politics lack--broad representation for the public in the decision-
making process and wiser decisions. In addition, requiring ideological balance will
defuse what has become a drawn out and highly partisan judicial selection process.
VI. IMPLEMENTING REFORM
If we want to ensure ideologically balanced Justices, courts, or decisions, how
would that be accomplished? Can it happen by statute, would a constitutional
amendment be required, or are there other paths to adoption?
A. Ideologically Balanced Justices
As mentioned earlier, we could ensure ideologically balanced or moderate
appointments in at least a couple of ways. We could follow the European approach
and require that any appointment be approved by a supermajority of the Senate.
Alternatively, the Senate could create a bipartisan judicial nominating commission
that would recommend potential nominees acceptable to both parties.
There are no bars to the Senate creating a judicial nominating commission as a
way to meet its Article II, Section 2 responsibility to provide "advice" to the
President for judicial appointments, and the Senate could make clear that it would
consent only to nominees recommended by its commission. However, since the
Constitution rests nominating authority with the President, the Senate could not
n Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,489-90 (2005).
74 Five Years After Kelo: The Sweeping Backlash Against One of the Supreme Court's Most-Despised
Decisions, INST. FOR JUSTICE 3 (June 2010), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/kelo5yearann-
whitepaper.pdf.
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directly require the president to abide by its recommendations. For that, a
constitutional amendment would be needed.
As to requiring a supermajority vote for approval, that probably would require
a constitutional amendment. Since the Constitution specifies supermajority votes for
some responses by the Senate to presidential action, as with ratification of a proposed
treaty or overriding of presidential vetoes,7 5 adoption of a supermajority vote rule for
judicial nominations by the Senate would be viewed as an encroachment on
presidential authority and therefore a violation of the separation of powers. But the
Senate could exercise its Article 1, Section 5 power to determine the rules of its
proceedings and use a filibuster rule to effectively require a supermajority vote.7 6
Until this year, 60 votes were needed to close debate on a Supreme Court nomination.
The cloture rule could be modified to require 67 votes, and if it were employed
strictly, could ensure that any nomination would have the support of both Democrats
and Republicans.7 7
B. Ideologically Balanced Courts
Since Congress has authority to determine the number of Justices on the
Supreme Court and the number ofjudges on the circuit courts of appeal,7 8 legislation
could set the number of seats on each appellate court at an even number.
As mentioned earlier, we could ensure a 50-50 split between conservative and
liberal Justices or judges by creating two judicial nominating commissions, one with
Democratic Senators, and the other with Republican Senators. The analysis for
adopting the two commissions parallels that for the single judicial nominating
commission for moderate Justices or judges. The Senate could exercise its advisory
role on judicial nominations to establish the commissions, and it could exercise its
consenting role to make clear that it would approve only those nominees
recommended by its commissions. However, a constitutional amendment would be
needed to require the president to select nominees from the commissions'
recommendations. A constitutional amendment also would be needed to eliminate
Senate confirmation so as to prevent a Senate majority from blocking the ideological
nominees of a president from the other party.
75 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; id art. 1, § 7.
76 WALTER OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-779 GOV, SUPER-MAJORITY VOTES IN THE SENATE
(2010).
7 As mentioned earlier, the Senate majority can discard a cloture rule giving it less stability than a statute
or constitutional amendment.
7 ELIZABETH R. BAZAN, JOHNNY KILLIAN & KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32926,
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY OVER THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (2005).
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C. Ideologically Balanced Decisions
Per constitutional text, Congress seems to have the power to enact legislation
imposing a supermajority voting requirement on the Supreme Court. According to
Article LU, Section 2, of the Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises its appellate
jurisdiction "under such regulations as the Congress shall make." And the Judiciary
Act of 1789 includes many regulations for the federal judiciary.
The main argument against a legislated supermajority requirement would rest
on principles of the separation of powers. If Congress can require a supermajority
vote instead of a simple majority, it can better insulate its actions from judicial
review. On the other hand, one could argue that constitutional challenges should have
to persuade more than a mere majority of Justices. As the Supreme Court regularly
observes, legislation passed by Congress carries a strong presumption of
constitutionality."
The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals could adopt a policy of consensual
decision making on their own. Chief Justice John Roberts has promoted a norm of
decision making based on broad agreement, 0 and European constitutional courts
have developed policies of consensual decision making on their own. The Supreme
Court observed a norm of consensual decision making for most of its history."i Until
1941, the Justices typically spoke unanimously-dissents were written in only about
8% of cases. Now, one or more Justices dissent in about 60% of cases.82
VH. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to defend the current process for selecting Supreme Court Justices.
Allowing one side of the ideological divide to gain majority control of the Court
treats the minority unfairly, exacerbates political polarization, and increases the
chances of unwise decisions. The system is broken and only getting worse, as
' See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384 (1989) (observing that the Court should strike
down an act of Congress only "for the most compelling constitutional reasons"); United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976) (citing the "strong presumption of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress").
See also Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality and the
Individual Mandate, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1729-30 (2013) (discussing the existence of the
presumption absent the implication of an individual's fundamental rights).
a Hope Yen, Roberts Seeks Greater Consensus on Court, WASH. POST (May 21, 2006), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006052100678.html.
" Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 771
(2015).
" Id. at 776-77.
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) e DOI 10.5195/Iawreview.2018.565
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
POLITICS AND THE SUPREME COURT
PAGE | 435
reflected in the divisive battles to fill Justice Antonin Scalia's and Justice Anthony
Kennedy's seats.
To fix the judicial appointment process, we need incentives for cooperation
rather than incentives for conflict. By replacing winner-take-all politics with
ideological balance, we can do much to make the Supreme Court-and the lower
courts-operate in a fairer, more conciliatory, and wiser fashion.
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